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HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM HAS FAILED THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
KAREN SMITH*
Low-income and racial minority communities bear a
disproportionate burden of the negative environmental effects of our
modem industrialized society.' In the past twenty years, a national
grassroots movement has formed to challenge this problem. This
movement, the "environmental justice movement," hopes "to ensure
equity in the quality of the environment" in those communities.2 The
movement relies on the dedication and efforts of a diverse class of
participants, including lawyers, individuals from the affected
communities, and activists and organizers from the civil rights, poverty
and environmental spheres.3
Part I of this note discusses how the environmental justice
movement originated and how the term "environmental justice" differs
from "environmental racism." Part II of this note will examine the
evidence of environmental injustice and will explore the causes of
environmental injustice. Part III of this note will consider the legal
avenues that are available as potential remedies for those seeking
environmental justice and will evaluate the probable success of each.
Part IV of this note concludes that, because the legal system ultimately
fails as a means of achieving environmental justice, the future of the
environmental justice movement should revolve around the social arena.
* Senior staff member of the Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law;
J.D., 1997, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A., 1994, Kentucky Wesleyan College;
currently, Public Defender, Department of Public Advocacy, Stanton, Ky.
Serena Williams, The Fight for Environmental Justice: is the Courthouse the
Appropriate Battleground?, PUB. INTEREST L. REv. Spring 1996, at 17.
2 Id. Even Vice President Al Gore acknowledged the need for the environmental justice
movement. In late 1993, he told African-American church leaders that, "[tihose who are less able
to defend themselves, those who have less economic and political power within the larger community
are those most often taken advantage of and victimized with a disproportionate quantity of hazardous
waste and pollution and the harmful and unwanted byproducts of production." Gore continued, "It
is time for this nation to respond to this crisis . , . and we are beginning to respond." Carol E.
Dinkins, Impact of the Environmental Justice Movement on American Industry and Local
Government, 47 ADMiN. L. REv. 337, 343 (1995)(citing Melissa Healy, Administration Joins Fight
for "Environmental Justice"; Pollution: Minority Communities Are Armed with New Tools from
Capitol. Use of Civil Rights Act Encouraged, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1993, at A 1).
3
See Hope Babcock, Environmental Justice Clinics: Visible Models of Justice, 14 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 8 n.15 (1995).
326 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTh. L. [VOL. 12:325
I. INTRODUCTION
The environmental justice movement formally began in 1982
when the protests generated by one incident in Warren County, North
Carolina attracted national attention and outrage.4 North Carolina chose
Afton, an impoverished and 84% black community in Warren County,
as the site for a toxic waste landfill for over 32,000 cubic yards of PCB-
contaminated dirt.5 This decision incited local residents to form the
organization known as the "Warren County Citizens Concerned about
PCBs" and to hold demonstrations, along with national civil rights
leaders, against the landfill siting.6 Unfortunately, the protest only
resulted in the arrest of more than 500 participants, rather than resulting
in keeping the landfill out of Afton.7 However, the national attention and
outrage sparked by this incident became the foundation for the
environmental justice movement.'
The term "environmental racism" is often used interchangeably
with "environmental justice,"9 but it has its own distinct meaning.
"Environmental racism" focuses only on how people of color suffer a
"disproportionate share of environmental harms"'" instead of including
both the poor and racial minorities in such calculus. As urban
sociologist Professor Robert Bullard notes, the term "environmental
racism," in its most expansive sense, describes any environmental
"policy, practice, or directive that, intentionally or unintentionally,
differentially impacts or disadvantages individuals, groups, or
communities based on race or color.""' ' The term "environmental racism"
' Id. at 8; Williams, supra note 1, at 17. But see Williams, supra note 1, at
17(emphasizing that struggles previous to the Warren County protest "demonstrate an earlier pursuit
of social justice in an environmental context." For example, student riots at Texas Southern
University were "triggered by the death of a young African-American girl who drowned at a garbage
dump located next to an elementary school and a city park.").
'Williams, supra note 1, at 18.
6
1d.
' Babcock, supra note 3, at 8.
'Id.
' Anne K. No, Environmental Justice: Concentration on Education and Public
Participation as an Alternative to Legislation, 20 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 373, 374
n.2 (1996).
'0 Williams, supra note 1, at 18.
" Alice L. Brown, Environmental Justice: New Civil Rights Frontier, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATE 1993, at 813, 815 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 474, 1993) (quoting Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Equity: Examining the Evidence
of Environmental Racism. LAND AND USE F., Winter 1993, at 6). Bunyan Bryant, a professor at the
University of Michigan School of Natural Resources and Environment, defines "environmental
racism" as "an extension of racism. It refers to those institutional rles, regulations, and policies or
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was used first by the Reverend Benjamin Chavis, then with the United
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, when he incorporated
the term into the 1991 National People of Color Environmental
Summit.,,
II. EVIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE
While there are numerous specific examples of environmental
injustice, a description of just a few of the more prominent cases
demonstrates the extent of the injustice. Athens, a 54% African-
American and 43% Latino community in southern Los Angeles,
California, houses a hazardous waste transfer station.' 3 The station
"processes about 300 55-gallon drums of hazardous waste each day
before moving it to landfills." 4
In New Orleans, Louisiana, a local chemical plant developed a
gas leak, "in which a tanker car spewed an orange cloud of nitrogen
tetroxide," requiring the evacuation of approximately 3000 people. 5
When the city evacuated the predominantly white neighborhoods one
and a half days before the African-American neighborhoods, leaders of
the local African-American community later claimed that "race was a
factor in the evacuation. '"6
The South Side of Chicago, a predominantly Latino and African-
American community, "has perhaps the greatest concentration of
hazardous waste sites in the country, with fifty active or closed
commercial hazardous waste landfills, 100 factories, and 103 abandoned
toxic waste dumps."t
Lastly, in the west end of Louisville, Kentucky, a predominantly
African-American community, "[d]ioxin, a cancer-causing substance, has
been found in both the fish and the sediment in the lake" of a local
park.' The community also contains an inactive petroleum refinery
government or corporate decisions that deliberately target certain communities for least desirable
land uses, resulting in the disproportionate exposure of toxic and hazardous waste on communities
based upon certain prescribed biological characteristics." Bunyan Bryant, Introduction in,
ENViRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 1, 5-6 (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995).
2 Williams, supra note 1, at 18.
'I d at 17.
15Id.
16 id.
'" Charles Lee, Developing the Vision of Environmental Justice: A Paradigm for
Achieving Healthy and Sustainable Communities, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 571, 572-574 (1995).
" Williams, supra note 1, at 17.
1996-971
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"which still serves as storage for large amounts of chemicals."' 9
Additionally, researchers have performed four major studies
which document how low income and minority communities endure
disproportionate environmental harms under current environmental
policies and siting decisions. The first study resulted from the
unsuccessful protest of the siting decision in Warren County, North
Carolina.0 One of the protestors, Congressman Walter Fauntroy, then
Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, instructed the United
States General Accounting Office (GAO) to examine "the socioeconomic
and racial composition of the communities surrounding the four major
hazardous waste landfills...".2' in the Environmental Protection Agency's
Region IV.
22
In 1983, GAO published its findings that "reported a strong
correlation between race and poverty and the location of hazardous waste
facilities."23 African-Americans constituted a majority in three of the
four communities surrounding the facilities.2 "The three communities
were 52%, 63%, and 90% African American, respectively."25
Additionally, the populations of all four communities were generally
poor and at least 26% of the residents earned incomes below the poverty
line.26
The disturbing findings of the GAO report inspired the first
nationwide study on the demographics of the communities housing
hazardous waste sites.27  In 1987, the United Church of -Christ's
Commission for Racial Justice conducted the study and entitled it "Toxic
Wastes and Race in the United States." 2 The Commission performed a
two-part inquiry based on 1980 census information.29 First, the
19 d.
Willie Hemandez, Comment, Environmental Justice: Looking Beyond Executive Order
No. 12,898, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. &POL'Y 181, 182-83 (1996).
21 Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as
Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 921,921 (1992).
, Serena Williams, The Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine: One Common Law Theory for
Use in Environmental Justice Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVIL. L. & POL'Y REv. 223, 225 (1995).
(noting that "Eight southern states comprised Region IV: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Caroline, and Tennessee.").
2 Maria Ramirez Fisher, Comment, On the Road from Environmental Racism to
Environmental Justice, 5 ViLL. ENv'rL. L.J. 449, 456 (1994). GAO entitled its study, "Siting of
Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding
Communities." Williams, supra note 22, at 225.
' Williams, supra note 22, at 225.
25 id.
2' Dinkins, supra note 2, at 338.
27 Hernandez, supra note 20, at 183.
2S Lee, supra note 17, at 572.
9 Hernandez, supra note 20, at 183-84.
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Commission analyzed "the racial and socio-economic status of residents
of the zip code areas' 30 surrounding both commercial hazardous waste
facilities and uncontrolled toxic waste sites (UTWS).31 The Commission
then compared the demographics of those areas to the demographics of
the "zip code areas that did not have such facilities" or waste sites.32
In performing its inquiries, the Commission scrutinized more
than 415 operating commercial hazardous waste facilities and 18,164
UTWSs.33 The Commission concluded "that race is the single best
predictor of where commercial hazardous waste facilities are located,
even when accounting for socio-economic factors.
34
In fact, the average percentage of minorities living in
areas with an operating hazardous waste site was twice
that of the percentage of minorities living in areas
without such facilities. Further, in regions hosting two
or more commercial hazardous waste facilities, the
proportion of minority residents is more than triple the
percentage seen in communities not hosting such a
facility.35
The Commission also determined that race played a similar role
in predicting the location of UTWSs. 36 "[T]hree out of five African-
Americans and Hispanic-Americans share their neighborhoods with
UTWSs."
37
The significance of this study should not be underestimated. It
directed national attention to the previously "invisible issue of
disproportionate environmental contamination in poor communities and
communities of color," and, as a result, "the existence of degraded and
hazardous physical environments in minority, poor, and disenfranchised
' Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting
of Locally Undesirable Land Use Laws, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001, 1010 (1993).
"' Hernandez, supra note 20, at 184. See Been, supra note 30, at 1010 (defining
uncontrolled toxic waste sites as "either closed and abandoned dumps, disposal facilities, factories,
or warehouses that the Environmental Protection Agency identified as posing a potential threat the
environment and public health").
2 Been, supra note 30, at 1010; see Hernandez, supra note 20, at 184.




37 Id.; See Been, supra note 30, at 1011-12 (noting that the Commission found that to be
a slightly higher ratio than for whites of whom about 54% reside near an UTWS).
1996-97]
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communities became apparent and indisputable. '3,
The Environmental Protection Agency conducted the third major
study when its Administrator, William K. Reilly, established the
Environmental Equity Workgroup in 1990 to review the existing data of
environmental injustice.39 The Workgroup reported "that racial minority
and low-income communities experience a greater than average exposure
to selected air pollutants and hazardous waste facilities."'  Furthermore,
the Workgroup decided that "[tihere are clear differences between racial
groups in terms of disease and death rates," but that unfortunately,
"[tihere are. limited data to explain the environmental contribution to
these differences."'
'
The National Law Journal (NLJ) performed the last influential
environmental injustice study in 1992 when it investigated the
"relationship between race and the enforcement of environmental laws"
by the Environmental Protection Agency.42 The NLJ examined the past
seven year's worth of environmental lawsuits and all of the residential
toxic waste sites in the Superfund program under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).43
The study discovered "that the federal government is less
responsive to environmental.. .needs in minority communities than it is
to the needs of predominantly white neighborhoods."" The study
concluded that white communities receive dramatically higher penalties
under hazardous waste laws (as much as 500%), quicker placement on
the national priority action list, and up to a 42% more rapid cleanup
"' Lee, supra note 17, at 573. When the United Church of Christ, the Center for Policy
Alternatives, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People updated the
Commission's 1987 study to 1993, they concluded that the injustice had worsened. After the groups
evaluated 530 commercial hazardous waste facilities with 1990 U.S. census data updated to 1993,
their report "found that minorities were 47% more likely than caucasians to live near a toxic waste
site in 1993. Additionally, it noted that the percentage of minorities residing adjacent to toxic waste
dumps increased from 25% in 1980 to nearly 31% in 1993." Stacy Hart, A Survey of Environmental
Justice Legislation in the States, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1459, 1462 (1995).
3 Williams, supra note 22, at 225; Fisher, supra note 23, at 226.
' Williams, supra note 22, at 226. But the report also found that the "exposure did not
always result in immediate or acute health effects." ld
' ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB No. 230-R-92-00078, ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 11 (1992). Note that, while the Workgroup
recommended that the EPA should prioritize environmental injustice issues higher and improve the
amount and quality of its communications with minority and poor communities, its recommendations
were incomplete. Notably absent were proposals for "statutory solutions for victims of
environmental inequity seeking damages for the harms they have suffered," and proposals for
'way[s] of preventing those harms before they were incurred by the minority and low-income
communities." Williams, supra note 22, at 226.
4 Brown, supra note 1 I, at 815.
43 id.
44 id.
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response.4 5 The white communities also receive more stringent cleanup
programs.46
Although "the weight of the evidence is persuasive that
minorities and low income populations suffer a disproportionate share of
the environmental burdens of an affluent society,"47 and suffer a
disproportionate government response, there is little agreement among
scholars about what is the ultimate cause of the injustice. Nevertheless,
it seems clear that one of the contributing factors is racism, both in
environmental policy and siting decisions.4"
As Professor Derrick Bell proclaimed in a recent speech, "The
fact is: racism is far from dead in the last decade of twentieth century
America. The civil rights gains, so hard won, are being steadily eroded.
Despite undeniable progress for many, no African American is insulated
from incidents of racial discrimination." Racism is ingrained in our
culture. The mark of racism has been etched into our political and socio-
economic institutional structures and into our national psyche. Although
overt racism is against the law, conscious and unconscious racist
attitudes are still widespread. 49
However, rather than blaming the environmental injustice on
intentional discrimination, critics often explain that economics or
"market forces" cause the injustice.5" Because minority and poor
communities suffer from decreased property values, those locations
financially appeal to decision makers. Those decision makers obviously
want to choose the least expensive sites to build environmentally
hazardous facilities. 5'
Additionally, commentators attribute environmental injustice to
4 Hernandez, supra note 20, at 190.
Id. at 190-91 (stressing how "[ait minority sites, the EPA chooses 'containment' more
frequently than permanent 'treatment,' the [clean-up] method preferred under the law. In contrast,
the EPA orders treatment 22% more often in white communities than in minority communities").
" Babcock, supra note 3, at 9. But see Been, supra note 30, at 1014 (asserting that the
strength of the environmental justice studies' evidence "is limited by the imprecision of the studies'
definition of the neighborhoods compared").
'Babcock, supra note 3, at 10.
49 d. at 10-11. But see Been, supra note 30, at 1014 (contending that the evidence from
environmental justice studies fails to prove that intentionally discriminatory siting decisions cause
the disproportionate environmental burdening).
50 Babcock, supra note 3, at 12 ("Market forces can also play a large role in the
inequitable distribution of environmental hazards."). See also Fisher, supra note 23, at 458. One
characteristic response to charges of environmental racism in siting decisions for hazardous waste
facilities "portrays the determination of disposal facility locations as an economic ... issue, not a
racial issue." Id.
"' Babcock, supra note 3, at 12; see also Fisher, supra note 23, at 458-59.
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the political disenfranchisement of the poor and minorities.52 Those
communities' political weakness prevents them from being well-
represented at all levels of government. 53 Thus, politicians and policy
makers "are not informed about the environmental problems that
particularly afflict communities of color and the poor. There is also little
political pressure to address these problems, and often no significant
political opposition in these communities when faced with
[environmental threats]. ... 5' The poor and minorities' political
weakness also frustrates the ability of their communities to campaign
successfully against hazardous waste facility siting decisions or other
types of environmental injustice. 5
Furthermore, critics charge "white flight" with causing the
disparate impact." Arguably, a community chosen for a hazardous waste
facility site may not have been predominately poor or minority when the
facility was sited.57 Instead, the local residents who are wealthy or
Caucasian could have moved out of the neighborhood in response to the
siting. Because of the mass flight, housing in those neighborhoods
became less expensive and more available. Then the poor or people of
color, who struggle to find housing which is affordable and offered on
a non-discriminatory basis, could have moved in.58
These theories do suggest that factors other than intentional
discrimination against impoverished or minority communities may
contribute to the disproportionate environmental burdening of those
communities. However, they are "insufficient explanation[s] of the
disparity" and they fail to justify the overwhelmingly discriminatory
impact of current environmental policies and siting decisions.59
5 Babcock, supra note 3, at 13-14; see also Fisher, supra note 23, at 459 ("The political
weakness of minority groups also contributes to the likelihood that waste facilities will be located in
communities of color.").
53 Babcock, supra note 3, at 13.
s4 Id. at 14.
" See Fisher, supra note 23, at 459.
Hernandez, supra note 20, at 186.
'7 Been, supra note 30, at 1016 ("Most studies compare the current socio-economic
characteristics of communities that now host various LULUs [locally undesirable land uses] to those
that do no host LULUs. In doing so, they fail to examine the communities' demographics at the time
the facility was sited.").
"' Id at 1016. But see id. at 1019 (stressing that it is "not universally true" that wealthy
residents always will flee environmental hazards. "In fact, the wealthy will move away only if the
negative impact of the LULU is greater than the costs of relocating.").
9 Fisher, supra note 23, at 460.
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III. POTENTIAL LEGAL REMEDIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE
There are a couple of avenues of litigation that protestors can
pursue in hopes of either remedying present environmental injustice or
preventing future injustice.' Injustice protestors may bring suits under
civil rights laws or under tort theories."
A. Civil Rights Litigation
One of the main avenues of environmental justice litigation is
under civil rights laws such as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.62
Unfortunately, civil rights laws have not accomplished what the plaintiffs
and their supporters had hoped. As a matter of fact, "none of these laws,
either individually or in the aggregate, has yet directly helped plaintiffs
with their specific claims" of environmental injustice.
63
1. Equal Protection
Commonly, injustice plaintiffs have brought their claims under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4
Disappointingly, no equal protection plaintiff has succeeded.
Washington v. Davis65 and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.66 both severely. limit the effectiveness of Equal
Protection claims. Under both cases, "the Supreme Court requires a
showing of both statistically demonstrable disparate impact and specific
discriminatory intent for Equal Protection claims."67 And while injustice
plaintiffs "have been able to show a pattern of disparate impact, they
have been unsuccessful in showing a discriminatory purpose in siting
6 See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 524 (1994) ("[Sliting disputes have been the primary context for
environmental justice litigation.").
0" See Williams supra note 1, at 17; Babcock, supra note 3, at 15-21; Cole, supra note
60, at 536. 62 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1994); Babcock, supra note 3, at 18-20.
63 Babcock, supra note 3, at 19.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Babcock, supra note 3, at 19.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
67 Babcock, supra note 3, at 19.
1996-97]
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decisions. ' ' a
The original case to utilize the Equal Protection Clause as its
basis for its environmental justice lawsuit was a 1979 Texas case, Bean
v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.69 In Bean, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for a preliminary injunction to challenge a solid waste facility
siting decision that they considered to be motivated by racial
discrimination.7" The Texas Department of Health granted the
defendant, Southwestern Waste Management, a permit to operate a waste
facility in an area of Houston and Harris County that was 1700 feet away
from a predominantly black high school that had no air conditioning.71
The plaintiffs argued that because the siting decision was motivated by
racial discrimination, the permit should be revoked.72
The plaintiffs proposed two theories of liability which they
believed established discriminatory intent by the Department.73 First, the
plaintiffs argued that the siting decision was part of a "pattern or
practice" by the Department of "discriminating in the placement of solid
waste sites., 74 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the Department's siting
decision, "in the context of the historical placement of solid waste sites
... constituted discrimination."
7 5
The court rejected both theories because it found the statistical
data insufficient to prove that the Department's siting decision was
motivated by the required "intent to discriminate on the basis of race." 
76
The court concluded that the statistics disproved a pattern of
discrimination because city-wide, 58.8% of the sites granted permits by
TDH were located in census tracts with 25% or less minority population
at the time of their opening and 82.4% of the sites granted permits by
TDH were located in census tracts with 50% or less minority population
at the time of their opening.77
Additionally, the court determined that the statistics refuted the
argument that the permit approval amounted to discrimination in the
"' Williams, supra note 1, at 19 (citing East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-
Bibb county Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D.Ga. 1989), affd 896 F.2d 1264
(1 th Cir. 1989); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.Va. 1991).)
9 Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp, 482 F. Supp. 673 (1979); see Cole,
supra note 60, at 523.
70
Bean, 482 F.Supp. at 674-675.
' Id. at 675, 679-680.
I Id. at 675.
"Id. at 677-679.
'I Id. at 677.
"Id. at 678.




context of the historical placement of waste sites. First, there were two
solid waste sites to be used by Houston. While the site at issue was in a
census tract with a primarily minority population (58.4%), the other cite
was in a primarily Anglo census tract (81.6%)." Second, after analyzing
the solid waste sites located in the target area, the court found it "very
hard to conclude that the placing of a site in the target area evidence[d]
purposeful racial discrimination" because half of the sites were in census
tracts with more than 70% Anglo population.79 Third, when evaluating
the city as a whole, "Houston consisted of 42.5% minority tracts and
57.5% Anglo tracts."8 And 42.2% of the solid waste sites were located
in minority tracts and 57.8% were located in Anglo tracts. "The
difference between the racial composition of census tracts in general and
the racial compositition of census tracts with solid waste sites is, at best,
only 0.3%. That is simply not a statistically significant difference."'"
Thus, the court refused to grant the plaintiffs their preliminary
injunction 82
Despite of the plaintiffs' court loss, their case did result in some
positive achievements. Their case is "widely regarded" as originating the
litigation aspect of the environmental justice movement.8 3  Also,
"Houston restricted the dumping of garbage near public facilities such as
schools, a form of zoning that was unprecedented in the only major U.S.
city without zoning laws. '' 4 Furthermore, "the Texas Department of
Health began to require demographic data from landfill proponents...
.,85 And most importantly, "the idea of using civil rights law to combat
environmental racism was born.
86
There are two other principal cases where injustice plaintiffs
have relied on the Equal Protection clause. These were a 1990 Georgia
7 
d. at 678.
79 Id. The court so concluded even though the target area has predominantly minority
population (70%) and "contains 15% of Houston's solid waste sites, but only 6.9% of its population."
Id.
'0 ld. at 679.
' L The court defined a "minority census tract" as one with more than 39.3% minority
population since Houston's population is 39.3% minority. Id.
12 d at 680. But Judge McDonald, who wrote the opinion, did leave the plaintiffs with
the dubious comfort that if the court was the Texas Department of Health, "it might very well have
denied this permit. It simply does not make sense to put a solid waste site so close to a high school,
parituclary one with no air conditioning." The judge went on to say, "It is not my responsibility to
decide whether to grant this site a permit. It is my responsibility to decide whether to grant the
plaintiffs a preliminary injunction." Id. at 679-680.
C3 cole, supra note 60, at 539.
SId.
I d. at 539 n.79.
Ild. at 539.
1996-97]
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case, East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning
and Zoning Commission,87 and a 1991 Virginia case, R.LS.E., Inc, v.
Kay.!' These plaintiffs also were unsuccessful because, similar to the
plaintiffs in Bean, their evidence was insufficient to prove discriminatory
intent. 9
In East-Bibb, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the local planning
and zoning commission from granting a use permit to Mullis Tree
Service for operation of a private landfill in the plaintiffs
neighborhood. 90 The plaintiffs, the East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood
Association and two individual residents, contended that the
"Commission's choice of a landfill site denied them equal protection of
the law because the decision affected more black persons than white
persons."' The proposed landfill site was located in a census tract which
housed 3,367 black residents and 2,149 white residents.92
The court ruled that the plaintiffs' allegation that the landfill
would affect more black than white persons failed to establish an equal
protection violation. Their evidence was insufficient "to demonstrate
that the Commission acted with a [racially] discriminatory intent when
it approved Mullis's application, or that the Commission engaged in a
historical pattern of discriminatory conduct.1
93
First, the Commission did not act with a discriminatory intent
when viewed against its historical background.94 The Commission had
never before located a landfill in a majority black area. Also, in previous
zoning decisions, the Commission frequently refused to grant the
applicant's permit in response to the local opposition. Finally, the
Commission made a statement showing it recognized that some areas in
the community still suffered from racial discrimination. That recognition
probably encouraged the Commission "to exercise vigilance in guarding
against such unprincipled influence."95
Second, plaintiffs failed to establish intent by a historical pattern
of discriminatory conduct by the Commission. The commission had
East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
896 F.2d 1264 (11 th Cir. 1990).
SR.I.S.E., Inc., v. Kay, 768 F.Supp. 1144 (ED.Va. 1991).
East-BibbTwiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibbs Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
896 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1990); R.I.S.E., Inc., v. Kay, 768 F.Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D.Va.
1991).
'0 East-Bibb, 896 F.2d at 1264-65.
" Id. at 1265.





9' Id. at 885-886.
[VOL. 12:325
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approved only one other landfill, and it was located in a census tract
which contained a predominantly white population. The tract housed
1045 white residents but only 320 black residents.96
In R.LS.E., the plaintiff sued the County Board of Supervisors
for allegedly violating the plaintiffs right to equal protection under the
law when it placed a landfill in a predominantly black area of the
county. 7 In the half-mile radius surrounding the landfill site at issue, the
population was 64% black and 36% white.9"
Even though this plaintiff, unlike the plaintiffs in the other equal
protection cases, could show a "historical placement of landfills in
predominantly black communities" by the Board,99 the court still rejected
the plaintiffs claim. The plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the
Board acted with the required discriminatory purpose.l°° The Board's
administrative steps revealed nothing unusual or suspicious.01 The
Board was drawn to the site at issue because geotechnical tests had
already been performed on it. The tests revealed that the site was
"environmentally suitable for the purpose of landfill development."'0'2
Although the Board previously prohibited a landfill from operating in
a predominantly white area, yet approved the operation of this landfill in
a predominantly black area, such actions were "based not on the racial
composition of the respective neighborhoods in which the landfills are
located but on the relative environmental suitability of the sites."'0 3
Because of the problem that these plaintiffs encountered and that
all future plaintiffs will encounter in proving the required intentional
discrimination, "the equal protection clause is no longer a viable cause
of action in most [environmental justice] cases."" 4 Indeed, because of
the apparently insurmountable intent requirement, "[c]ivil rights lawyers
Id. at 880, 884.
'9 R.I.S.E. Inc., v. Kay, 768 F.Supp. 1144,1145 (E.D.Va. 1991). The plaintiff "R.I.S.E.,
Inc. (Residents Involved in Saving the Environment) is a bi-racial community organization formed
for the purpose of opposing the development of the proposed regional landfill that is the subject of
this case." Id.
I"ld. at 1148.
Id. at 1149. The board had placed three previous landfills in predominantly black
communities. In 1969, a landfill was developed in a community that was 100% black. In 1971, a
landfill was sited in an area that was 95% black. In 1977, a landfill was placed in location that was
100% black. Idat 1148.
1d. at 1149.
"' Id. at 1149-50.
1d. at 1150.
o Id. at 1150. The court noted that the prohibited landfill was an "environmental
disaster" -- dumping began before any tests were performed, later tests indicated that there was
incinerator ash in the ground water, and there was no clay soil to prevent ground water pollution. Id.
at 1149.
,04 Cole, supra note 60, at 540.
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have opined that environmental justice cases using federal equal
protection claims will be 'certain losers'."'
0 5
2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Instead of challenging environmental injustice under the Equal
Protection Clause and its accompanying intent requirement, injustice
protestors may be better served by bringing their claims under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .t06 "Title VI bars discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin under federally funded
programs."'07 This avenue of litigation may be preferable to plaintiffs
suffering from environmental injustice because it has a less stringent
intent requirement." 8 Although Title VI litigants must prove that the
defendant intentionally discriminated, federal regulations and case law
hold that a "discriminatory effect (or disparate impact) alone is enough
to show unlawful discrimination."' 9 Thus, civil rights injustice plaintiffs
have a lighter burden of proof under Title VI than under an equal
protection challenge.
But Title VI does present plaintiffs with one extra litigation
hurdle that restricts its usefulness for plaintiffs. 0 It requires plaintiff to
show "a nexus to federal monies.""' But this hurdle is not as difficult to
overcome as it might seem because of Title VI's "broad coverage."11
2
Most state and local agencies that a plaintiff might want to sue are
probably covered by Title VI "[b]ecause many state agencies receive
federal funding .... and because Title VI broadly defines 'program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.'""13
While Title VI does appear to have great potential for
environmental injustice plaintiffs, it has not yet directly provided them
,o Id. at 540-41. But see Dinkins, supra note 2, at 349 (emphasizing that some equal
protection plaintiffs have attained success through settlements. For example, "In 1983, a company
reportedly paid $24 million to the residents of African-American Triana, Alabama, to settle a case
alleging contamination of the town's residents, the water supply, and the residents' favorite fishing
pond. Two years later, another company paid $20 million to residents of a West Dallas public
housing project to settle litigation.").
'"Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq.; Cole, supra note
60, at 531.
,o' Fisher, supra note 23, at 471.
,o Id. at 472; Cole, supra note 60, at 531.
'o Cole, supra note 60, at 531.
" Fisher, supra note 23, at 472-73.
..Id. at 473.
112 Cole, supra note 60, at 532.
"' Id. at 532. Title VI's broad applicability is enlarged further because it "applies to an
entire agency if even one part of that agency receives federal funding." Id. at 532.
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with a courthouse victory. ' 4 However, the plaintiffs in Crest Street
Community Council, Inc., v. North Carolina Department of
Transportation attained an indirect victory when their Title VI freeway
siting claim prompted North Carolina to negotiate a settlement with them
rather than undergo a courtroom battle.'1
In Crest, neighborhood organizations filed an Administrative
Complaint with the United States Department of Transportation
(USDOT) to protest the North Carolina Department of Transportation's
plan to extend a freeway through their predominantly black, low-income
neighborhood." '6 They contended that the freeway proposal was in
violation of Title VI and thus any further planning or construction of the
freeway should be prohibited until North Carolina was in compliance
with all applicable laws. 117
When USDOT's Director of the Office of Civil Rights made a
preliminary finding that there was "reasonable cause to believe that
construction according to the NCDOT proposal would constitute a prima
facie violation of Title VI" and one of its regulations,' '8 the defendants
initiated "extensive negotiations" with the plaintiffs to reconcile their
differences." 9 Both parties agreed to a Final Mitigation Plan that
established what efforts the city and NCDOT were required to make to
mitigate the freeway's detrimental impact on the plaintiffs'
neighborhood. 2
In the Plan, the defendants agreed to develop a new community
site in the same area so the neighborhood residents could continue to be
an intact community. Furthermore, "the defendants moved the proposed
highway right-of-way and modified an interchange so as to preserve the
.4 Babcock. supra note 3, at 21. In fact, in one Ohio case, the plaintiffs lost on the merits.
While the plaintiffs did demonstrate "that the routing of the proposed 1-670 freeway would be
through neighborhoods that ranged from fifty to ninety percent African-American -- according to the
Court a 'prima facie showing of disparate effect upon racial minorities' -- the defendant was able to
overcome that hurdle by showing that alternative routes would have had more negative impact on
African-American neighborhoods." Cole, supra note 60, at 533 (citing Coalition of Concerned
Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).).
.1 Cole, supra note 60, at 533; Crest Street Community Council, Inc. v. North Carolina
Dep't of Transp., 598 F.Supp. 258 (1984).
.6 Id. at 259-260.
7 Id. at 260.
5 Id. The regulation, 49 C.F.R. section 231.5(b)(3), states, "fi]n determining the site
or location of facilities, a recipient or applicant may not make selections with the purpose or effect
of excluding persons from, denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination under
any program to which this regulation applies, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin; or with
the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives
of the Act of this part." Id. at 260.
"
9 Id. at 260.
'
2 Id. at 261.
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community church and park." 12' The defendants estimated that the cost
of these mitigation efforts would be over three million dollars. The
plaintiffs admitted that this settlement provided them with "very
substantial relief." 1
22
Crest suggests that Title VI has some potential, albeit still
unproven, as a litigation tactic for environmental injustice plaintiffs.
123
And while that unproven potential is better than the certain failure of
Equal Protection litigation, until there is a concrete Title VI courtroom
victory, this litigation avenue can provide only hope of, but no guarantee
of, successful results to injustice plaintiffs.
However, in spite of the failure of most of these individual civil
rights cases, there are some benefits to bringing civil rights claims rather
than choosing other forms of litigation.24 The first benefit is that the
litigation "nam[es] names."'" By bringing a civil rights suit against
named local government officials, the plaintiffs' morale is raised because
the suit "allows a community to say 'officially' what has existed for a
long time."'26  The suit permits the plaintiffs to say "that the
[government] official being sued is engaging in racist practices." 27
Civil rights litigation also enables the plaintiffs to gain allies.'28
"By calling a dispute a civil rights struggle, a group may gain allies from
other organizations in the region who previously may not have
recognized the civil rights implication of the community's struggle for
environmental justice."1
29
Third, civil rights claims have the potential benefit of educating
the judiciary.' ° "While courts have not yet ruled favorably on an
environmental justice civil rights case, the increasing number of such
cases being brought may be having an effect in educating the
judiciary."' 13' And as our judicial history about school desegregation
proves, educating the judiciary about civil rights can result in eventual
121 Id.
2 Id.
' Cole, supra note 60, at 534.




' Id. at 543.
129 Id. But see id. at 543 (noting how bringing civil rights litigation can be a hindrance
because "[alt the same time, the group may lose allies who are squeamish about talking about race
issues").
'3o Id. at 543.




B. Tort Theory Litigation
Rather than addressing their environmental grievances through
civil rights litigation, injustice plaintiffs instead could utilize tort theories
such as nuisance, trespass, or strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities as the bases for their suits. 33 While a few plaintiffs have been
successful, this litigation tactic still presents significant drawbacks to
injustice litigants.
34
The most important limitation is that tort theories fail to facilitate
or even allow any discussion in the courtroom regarding plaintiffs
suffering environmental harms because of their race or economic
standing in the community.'35 Second, because expert testimony is
generally required to prove causation and damages, tort-based injustice
claims may be prohibitively expensive for the affected communities. 136
Third, the plaintiffs are often blamed for causing their own health
injuries. '37 "Poor people and people of different backgrounds from their
jurors generally are less likely to successfully fend off this defense tactic
.. Lastly, each individual tort theory has its unique weaknesses.
Nuisance plaintiffs must be able to prove they suffer a
significant harm from the nuisance which they will not be able to do if
they suffer "widespread, but individually modest, harms."' 39
Additionally, to be a nuisance, the land use must be unreasonable.
Unfortunately, however,
in determining whether a land use is "unreasonable,"
most states use a balancing test that weighs the gravity
of the harm to [the] plaintiff against the utility of [the]
defendant's conduct. Among the factors for
determining the utility of [the] defendant's conduct is
the social value attached to the primary purpose of the
132 ld. ("Many of the first cases brought under civil rights laws to challenge such [school]
segregation failed, and it was only through years of strategically brought lawsuits.., that civil rights
lawyers finally prevailed in court").
' Williams, supra note 1, at 19.
34 See id. at 17.
35 See id. at 27.
' See Williams, supra note 22, at 250.
137 Allan Kanner, Environmental Justice, Torts and Causation, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 505,
509 (1995).
13 
sd."'9 Williams, upra note 1, at 19.
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conduct. Thus, a court may find significant harm and
yet grant no relief because the value of the activity to
society is greater than the harm; in effect, the plaintiffs
may be forced to subsidize the activity by bearing the
burden while society as a whole reaps the benefits.4 '
While anticipatory nuisance plaintiffs have the possibility of
attaining the "optimal result," prevention of the environmental harm,
they first must overcome a major difficulty. 4' They must prove "that an
activity or structure is highly likely to be a nuisance without the powerful
evidence of the actual stench, vermin and traffic jams."'42
Trespass plaintiffs must establish a "substantial harm" in order
to recover. Thus, they are disadvantaged by knowing that the scope of
liability of their defendant is limited.'43
Finally, plaintiffs suing under the theory of strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities are restrained by one of the factors used
by the court to determine if an activity is unusually dangerous -- the
"extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.""' Therefore, "a court may find that an industrial
activity with great economic value to the community in terms of its
employment and tax base is not abnormally dangerous."'45
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the numerous hurdles, drawbacks, and low success
rates that litigation offers injustice plaintiffs, the legal system ultimately
fails as a means of achieving environmental justice. Therefore, the
environmental justice movement should shift its focus from the legal
arena to the social arena. Such an approach has several advantages. For
example, the social arena holds unlimited potential unrestrained by
negative precedent and case law. Because of the proven failure of
litigation now mandated by stare decisis, the injustice protestors should
strive to increase and enliven the grassroots aspect of the environmental
justice movement.
The movement can accomplish this refocusing by using ongoing
and future litigation mainly as a tool to provoke media attention to the
140 Id. (emphasis added).
... Williams, supra note 22, at 249-50.
141 Id. at 250.




1 ld. at 21, 27.
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movement. Such media attention may serve to educate those residing in
the affected communities about the environmental hazards and energize
them into protest action. The media attention also simultaneously raises
the social consciousness of those outside the affected communities."t4 As
Derrick Bell notes, ."[1]itigation can and should serve lawyer and client
as a community-organizing tool, an education forum, a means of
obtaining data, a method of exercising political leverage, and a rallying
point for public support.'
147
Additionally, the movement can initiate and continue noticeable
and colorful protests, acts of civil disobedience, and campaigns against
potential unjust siting decisions.' Only through these actions will the
movement achieve success. It will not only educate those who make and
oversee environmental decisions and policies but also will encourage or
politically force them to change their environmental values. The under-
used social arena offers the only real promise of success for the
environmental justice movement.
'" Id at 27; Gerald Torres, Changing the Way Government Views Environmental Justice,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW at 561, 564-67 (ALI-ABA Course of Study C981, 1995).
' Cole, supra note 60, at 541.
'4 See Been, supra note 30.
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